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Abstract 
The financial turmoil that the 2007 subprime debacle of the US set into motion has raised a welter of puzzling 
questions for the policy makers across the world. The position seems all the more confusing in the Muslim world 
where the fast expanding Islamic finance operates in competition with the conventional in a dual setting. 
      The turmoil has led many to blaming the private lure for the colossal failure of financial institutions. In 
contrast, others counter argue to put public policy in the dock under the exalted banner of ‘regime uncertainty’. 
They blames the aggravation of the trouble on the uncalled for government intervention in financial markets. 
Interestingly, few draw attention to moral crimes committed on either side of the fence among the causative 
factors. 
     This paper seeks to investigate if the monetary policies the Central Banks follow - now including the Basel 
capital adequacy norms as well - would suit or suffice Islamic banking institutions competing with the 
conventional in a dual financial framework? In this context, it questions the claim that risk-sharing is or can 
alone be the basis for Islamic finance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper deals with monetary policy in a dual financial system composed of Islamic and 
conventional sectors operating in a competitive setting. Monetary policy addresses a number 
of objectives: mobilization of resources for sustainable economic growth, promote 
distributional equity and keeping the internal as well as external value of money stable. But 
here we are looking at it from the viewpoint of controls a Central Bank can employ to 
achieve reasonable stability in the price levels so often disturbed disquietingly by financial 
crises like the one that has gripped the globe since 2007, the most devastating since the Great 
depression of 1930s. Such an exercise needs a relook on credit creation process and its 
efficacy for Islamic banks. As profit sharing replaces interest based financing, determinants 
of the sharing ratio and what role it could play in controlling credit creation has also to be 
assessed. 
         This crisis has not only downed the mighty financial institutions across countries but 
has bankrupted state after state in Europe. The fall of Lehman Brothers in US in 2008, 
triggered the onset of the economic devastation the world had never seen after the 1930s 
(Cihak and Demirguc-Kunt, 2013). The sub-prime debacle in the US pulled off the covering 
from the Western financial system. Its machinations to enrich bank owners, managers and 
agents at the expense of borrowers and depositors could no longer remain concealed. Figure 1 
shows the process leading to the debacle. Giant banks and insurance companies long 
considered invincible took little time to crack and collapse in its aftermath.  But the US 
happenings proved only symptomatic of the storm that was fast crossing the Atlantic. Europe soon 
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found banks failures knocking at the doors of one country after another, the Cyprus bank failures 
being the latest in the chain. As the institutions were considered too big to sink, keeping them afloat  
 
 
 
Britten Woods arrangements in 1971
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    According to Global Financial Stability Report (2012), the Euro area crisis remains the key threat to 
global financial stability. The increasing nexus between monetary and fiscal policies across the globe 
made many countries on the continent face swelling mountains of sovereign debt. Along with banks, 
bailing out failing states – Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Belgium and now Cyprus are all in deep 
trouble. Oblivious to this unending scenario across the Atlantic, Islamic economists and financial gurus 
continue to look westward for guidance and imitation. The average rate of unemployment in Eurozone 
countries has already hit the 12% mark in 2011. Is it still sense to believe as some do, that “only by 
replicating conventional structures can Islamic finance create the breadth and depth of its products”? It is 
time perhaps to think afresh and change course. For this, we have to understand why the theory and 
practice of the system that inspired developing countries to follow the course failed its own champions so 
savagely.  
 
2. Risk profit and finance 
 
A primary attribute of competition is the tendency to eliminate economic profit or loss and 
bring the prices of real goods and services to equality with their money costs. Economic 
theorists have therefore searched for the source of profit in what makes competition 
imperfect. Frank H. Knight (1921) convincingly argued that it was uncertainty born of 
dynamic change that made reality depart from the ideal profitless state in an economy. 
Uncertainty breeds risk and divides the society into those who prefer to take risks in the 
expectations of large gains and those who want to avoid risks in favor of getting sure specific 
even if smaller incomes. Risk-preference and risk-aversion divided human beings into the 
hired and un-hired production factors in all societies independent of time and space. 
                                                          
2
 The current crisis exhibits a unique and worrisome characteristic.  It is moving in a go-halt-go mode: today is 
sunshine in the Wall Street, tomorrow the pall of gloom. In 2010 the US economy was seen as out of the tunnel. 
The BBC on June 18, 2014 informs us that the Federal Reserve has cut for the fifth time the US growth forecast 
for 2014 to between 2.1% and 2.3%, down from its March forecast of 2.8% to 3%. It has also trimmed back its 
stimulus programme by $10bn a month to $3.5bn!       
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became an unceasing social imperative laced with evil. Indeed, financial crises in the world became 
more frequent and damaging with the passage of time, the trend is gaining pace after the collapse of 
the 
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Entrepreneurs, however defined, fall in the un-hired category. They guarantee fixed specific 
returns to the hired factors of production – money lenders, workers and property owners – in 
the form of interest, wages and rent. Entrepreneurs choose to be claimants of the residual 
business earnings in the expectations of large gains but have to simultaneously expose their 
investment to the risk of shrinkage (loss) if revenue receipts belie expectations and fall short 
of payments due to the hired factors.
3
   
 
2.1 Risk-sharing versus risk-transfer 
     This inevitable division of people into hired and un-hired factors knocks at the bottom of a 
plea now gaining currency in Islamic economics. It is being argued that risk-sharing could 
alone be the Islamic basis of pecuniary contracts. To be sure, this is not a new plea.  Only a 
new garb is being provided to the old edict ‘no risk, no gain’ is an adage long paraded in 
Islamic finance. No one disputes that participatory finance is in principle a more desirable 
rather preferred mode for Islamic financing. But projecting that risk-sharing is the only form 
acceptable to the system raises ticklish issues. 
      First, there is little positive support for risk-sharing in the demonstration, however 
convincing, in showing what havoc risk-transfer has brought to world economy over time and 
space unless one can produce empirical evidence as to what risk-sharing could do in the 
present era.   
     Second, it may be argues that with eloquence that risk-sharing was the divine desideratum 
to promote mutual help and cooperation and peace among humans who had opted to run 
affairs on Earth as the vicegerent of Allah (swt). But what has man done; especially what 
Muslims are doing? 
    Third, leave the cosmopolitan approach aside and take the organization of economic 
activity within a country. All factors of production are exposed to risk, not capital alone. 
Workers are exposed to unemployment – there may not be coal I the house as there is too 
much coal in the market. Involuntary mass unemployment may and has occurred, due to 
natural calamities, wars to serve economic interests – Millions became penniless when 
Americans disbanded the Iraqi army with a wave of hand. Bridges, buildings, coal mines, 
nuclear plants collapse, many work in hazardous industries. Limb and life is lost. Who shares 
the risk with the hapless? Such risks are much more devastating for socities than the loss of 
money in business. 
      Fourth, ivory tower thinkers must avoid the glitch of considering risk sharing or transfer 
merely or largely an issue between groups of capital owners. Labour shares the risks too. So 
must share profits as well.  
       Fifth, risk-sharing cannot be detached from profit (loss) sharing. Risk being an ex-ante 
non-measurable variable, a one-on-one correspondence cannot be established between the 
two. Thus, a society based only on risk-sharing cannot be expected to ensure distributive 
justice and stay strife free. We cannot hope to put people long on opium. 
       Finally, it is misleading to suggest that current Islamic financing is all based on risk-
sharing or all conventional finance is just deceitful risk-transfer. Only 20% is the share of 
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participatory modes in Islamic finance; thus debt-based transactions – leasing and murabahah 
- dominate. In fact scholars are going to the extent of asking: Is Islamic finance in Malaysia 
interest free? And, there is even an opinion that pure mudarabah involves risk-transfer from 
the financier to the worker which may ex post turnout less than the transfer earning of the 
latter. If so risk-sharing would become exploitative of the worker..                              
      The logic of capitalism not only presupposes the existence of hired factors of production - 
workers and the natural resources - but also of an initial facility of finance provided by bank 
credit to pay for wages. The recent heterodox view that finance is a sort of invisible ex ante 
flow in modern economies has elements of truth; it links well with Keynes according 
recognition to the importance of money as financial asset. The recognition led to viewing 
money as an interest bearing claim the banks could create or destroy at will in response to 
variations in the demand for money (liquidity) even though it carried no intrinsic value. One 
reason, among others, for allowing banks to create credit is that the act facilitates the 
adjusting of supply of money to seasonal variations in its demand.      
          Islamic banks operate in a capitalist system in competition with their conventional 
counterparts. They cannot do business in defiance of the systemic requirements; they can 
possibly observe the Islamic ban on interest but would find survival difficult without credit 
creation. Fractional reserve system is a pre-requisite for credit creation. Hence, suggestions of 
keeping 100% reserve against deposits in Islamic banking are impracticable. It would thus be 
helpful to see briefly how banks create credit to understand and evaluate measures central 
banks use for controlling it to keep the system stable.     
3.  Credit creation process 
         How the fractional reserve system enables banks to create credit money is easy to see. 
Initially banks have cash deposits. Each bank knows by experience that on a normal day most 
people withdraw only a fraction in cash from their accounts. So, retaining a safe fraction of 
cash deposits, the bank lends the rest to a third party on interest. But it asks the borrower to 
open an account with the bank to deposit in the loan money. Thus, loans create deposits. The 
bank treats credit deposits as cash deposits and advances loan out of loan so to say. The 
process multiplies deposits raising their inverted pyramid. Suppose each bank retains on an 
average F fraction of cash deposits as reserve to meet the daily withdrawals while the central 
bank of the country wants banks to maintain with it a minimum fraction R of their deposits – 
cash + credit – in the form of cash. How much credit can a bank create given these 
constraints? Thecredit multiplier M provides the answer. Ignoring proof, M can be calculated 
as under.        
                                              M = 1/F [1 – R]                     (1) 
 
To illustrate, assume a bank has $50m in cash deposits and has to keep F = 0.1 fraction of the 
sum every moment in its safe to meet the daily withdrawal demands. Furthermore, suppose 
that each commercial bank is required to maintain 5% of its deposits –cash plus credit - in in 
the form of cash with the Central Bank, implying that R = 0.05. The credit multiplier M wil 
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then be 10 x 0.95 = 9.5. The 50m cash deposit with the bank will enable it to have a total 
deposit worth 50 x 9.5= 475m. If we take out $ 50m cash deposits from the total, the 
remaining $425m would be the credit-on-credit or loan deposits the bank has generated. 
Figure 2 presents a schematic depiction of how the process creates an inverted credit pyramid 
in the economy. Note that an individual bank cannot create credit disproportionate to others 
because on balance it will soon find its net cash inflows reducing via inter-bank clearances. 
The cash string forces it to remain with the group. However, the credit creation power of the 
banking system as a whole is tremendous as mutual claims against each other are largely 
cancelled. The interest received on this huge amount minus the part of it payable to cash 
deposit holders and  other operating expenses will all belong to the bank owners which they 
share with their managers and agents. 
      Banking is thus an exceedingly lucrative business. Maturity transformation via renewals 
converts short-term credits into long-term funding. Leverage gains tend to make businesses 
over-adventurous. Rising profits lure banks continue pumping in the air until the bubble 
burst, economies roll down the hill; unemployment becomes rampant. Rising leverage gains 
fuel greed and have largely been the cause of frequent financial turmoil like the one world 
faces since 2008. The solution is seen in strengthening the capital base for restraining credit 
expansion beyond the limits of safety. Standard capital adequacy ratios are being developed 
under what are known as Basel Accords
4
. Islamic financial institutions have also to fall in 
line. Monetary authorities in various Muslim countries and the IFSB are seized with the 
issue: the regulatory frameworks are being revamped and new standards are being designed. 
 
 
4. The determinants of profit sharing ratio 
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“Capital adequacy ratios are a measure of the amount of a bank's capital expressed as a percentage of its risk 
weighted credit exposures. An international standard which recommends minimum capital adequacy ratios has 
been developed to ensure banks can absorb a reasonable level of losses before becoming insolvent. Applying 
minimum capital adequacy ratios serves to protect depositors and promote the stability and efficiency of the 
financial system”. The Central Bak of New Zeeland. 
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Participatory finance is regarded as the high point of Islamic finance where losses are shared 
in the same ratios as the capital contributions but the sharing of profit arrangement is not to 
be the same.  The interesting question then is how the sharing of profit ratio is determined? 
Of course, it is settled by negotiations between the parties. But there have to be some factors 
guiding the negotiations. Mudarabah is a contract in which a financier, say a bank, provides 
funds to an entrepreneur (firm) for investing in a business venture to share profits in an 
agreed proportion, losses falling on capital alone.
5
 This view implies what we may call a 
puremudarabah model where the financier is assumed to provide the entire capital to an 
empty handed entrepreneur; the model fits well even today to small partnership businesses to 
undertake specific projects. But the modern economic scene is dominated by large 
corporations that have long eclipsed small proprietary businesses. Likewise, banks have 
almost completely replaced personal financing of the earlier era with institutional 
arrangements. What realistically fits in the present situations is the model of what we can 
term as mixed mudaraba, where the bank is an outside financier providing fund to running 
businesses on a profit sharing basis. Corporations operate mostly with their (owners) 
shareholders’ money supplemented by bank finance, if need be. Banks mostly use customer 
deposits for provide finance to various sort of borrowers – individuals, firms and public 
institutions.  
          Banks mostly employ two-tier mudarabahmodels to work as financial intermediaries. 
On the one hand they obtain deposits from the clients under profit (loss) sharing 
arrangements, on the other  hand they finance clients using the deposits plus their own money 
under the same sort of profit (loss) sharing contracts. It is obvious that the sharing ratio of 
profit with the depositors would be less than the sharing ratio with the borrowers, the 
difference being the banks’ margin (Hasan, 2008). We shall show that the sharing ratio with 
the depositors can be used as a credit control measure by the central banks.  
 
5. Profit sharing ratio and credit control 
 
In the classical view of mudaabah the entrepreneur was an empty-handed person the 
financier providing the entire capital. The business constituted a one off short-run project; the 
concept of a large sized running business requiring perennial investment with changing 
owners was not there. The scenario today is totally different. Corporate businesses need large 
investments on a long-run basis; Mudarabah has to join in a participatory financing program.   
In such a program the bank as mudarib would mostly provide only part – say λ fraction - of 
total capital K invested in a business. Thus, borrowed amount of money L divided by K 
would equals λ Thus, λ operates both as the loss sharing ratio for the bank as also the 
leverage measure for the borrowing firms. The business owners’ portion in capital would thus 
equal (1- λ) K. Of course, losses, if any, are to be shared between the firms and the bank in 
the same ratios as are their capital contributions i.e. (1-λ) and λ respectively.  
        In mixed mudarabah profit sharing applies to earnings that are allocable to the part of 
capital K a bank provides to the firm. Thus, if P were distributable profits, λP would be 
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allocable to the bank the pure financier. It is this part of profit which is the subject matter for 
sharing with the firm. Negotiations between the two lead to the decision that a fraction of 
this, say σ*, will go to the bank and the remaining (1- σ*) the firm will retain for 
entrepreneurial services it rendered to make bank money earn a return. It is easy to see what 
goes to the bank is a smaller fraction, say σ, of total profit P than σ*. For, σ* λP, the bank’s 
profit share, divided by P would equal σ* λ. In σ = σ* λ both σ* and λ being less than 1, their 
product σ must be smaller than either of them. The derivation of σ allows the treatment of the 
ratio issue at the macro level and helps construction of models to show, as in equation (2), 
that profit sharing ratio σ is a function of four variables i.e. the expected rate of profit r on 
capital K, the proportion of borrowings λ in K, the market rate of interest ri and the risk 
premium or economic profit α (Hasan, 1985).  
)( 

  ir
r
    where, λ (ri + α) < r  because  σ < 1             (2) 
It follows from equation (2) that in a competitive setting the sharing ratio σ for the bank at the 
macro level varies inversely with profit expectations r and directly with the remaining three 
determinants λ, ri, and α . We now change the explanation of these variables with reference to 
the mudarabah contract between the banks and their depositors so as to forge a credit control 
measure for Islamic banks. 
          We assume r to be the rate of profit on capital K that a bank invests in business (r = 
P/K). The bank has (1- λ) and the depositors λ share in K. Likewise, σ* is the banks’ ratio for 
the sharing of profit with the depositors. Now, suppose the maximum leverage gain (risk 
premium) the central bank allows to banks is β. The upper limit for return on bank investment 
share KB = (1 – λ) K would thus be r + β the remaining profit accruing to depositors on their 
investment KD = λK. From profit P, the amount (1 – λ) P would be allocable to the bank on its 
share in K but it will also get σ* fraction of profit allocable to the deposits i.e. of λ P. Thus, 
for the bank we may set up  
 
 
 
 
      
 
       It is obvious from equation (3)  that for any given values of r and λ the profit sharing 
ratio (PSR = σ ) for the bank would vary directly with β. Thus, β can be a cost free policy 
variable that the central bank of a country can use for mandatory ex post adjustment of the 
PSR in Islamic finance to enforce fairness in the distribution of mudaraba profits between the 
banks and the depositors.   
       The use of the instrument would also force banks to adjust their leverage ratios via   of 
equation (2) to harmonize with changes in β.  For, the introduction of β as the control variable 
into the picture would by definition affect α in equation (2) impacting in the process the size 
(3)1λ)(1.
r
β
σ
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of σ the banks’ profit sharing ratio with businesses that is making credit costlier or cheaper 
for the latter.  
       Equation (2) provides us a common sense but useful link between the profit sharing ratio of the 
banks and the rate of interest in a dual monetary system. Let us merge α with ri and put  /r = µ to 
make analysis easier. Take µ as a constant implying that only r and   could vary such that their ratio 
stays unchanged.  
           We now have a linear equation  = µ (ri+ α) which passes through the origin µ being 
its slope. It sets up a positive relationship between profit sharing ratio   and the rate of 
interest plus α as shown in Figure 3. It follows that for the same ri the profit sharing ratio
may fluctuate with changes in leverage   or profit expectation r or α. But it could also 
remain constant, if changes in   and r take place in the same direction such that µ remains 
unchanged.  
 
  
     It follows that if the central bank of the country lowers β that would increase the rate of 
return to the depositors leading to a reduction in bank margins. To keep their margins intact 
the banks are expected to demand higher profit sharing ratio  from the borrowing firms 
reducing the leverage lure and profits. Thus, β can be an effective control measure to curb 
inflation. During recession an increase in β could boost the sagging business morale through 
brightening profit expectations. Demand for investment funds may look up and credit 
creation may fill up emerging gaps. 
     The use of β as a credit control measure in a dual financial system has several advantages 
over the traditional bank rate policy. Bank rate policy operates through the manipulation of 
the money use price which conflicts with the Islamic ban on interest. In contrast,   leaves 
interest rate untouched; it operates directly on profit margins of both the financiers and the 
borrowing businesses having a better psychological impact. Interest rate is a blanket measure. 
It affects borrowings for all purposes in equal measure – relatively more urgent and socially 
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desirable or frivolous. Possibly, proves more amicable to pursue discretionary policies i.e. 
for selective control of investment channels. Finally, changes in interest rate affect the entire 
financing system – all purposes, all modes and all markets restricting the frequency of using 
it; β is more flexible (Hasan, 2010). 
 
 
6. Other credit control measures 
 
Open market operations:  
Normally, the Central bank of a country does not enter the financial markets but occasionally 
uses the right to encourage credit expansion or contraction through impacting the credit 
creation base of the commercial banks. It can do so because it always carries a stock of first 
class treasury bills and commercial securities. As opposed to interest rate the price of credit, 
open market operations affect the cash-base of commercial banks and thus their credit 
creation capability. 
       When the economy is climbing up money incomes tend to expand at a faster rate than 
real output (why?). Prices rise and the economy soon finds it in the grip of inflation. To 
reduce cash base with commercial banks, the Central bank starts selling securities in the open 
market competing with other sellers. The people purchasing these securities issue checks on 
their banks. Cash moves out from the banking system into the coffers of the Central banks. 
Credit multiplier is expected to work in to opposite direction exercising a dampening effect 
on price level. The action is reversed if the economy turns direction and going down the hill – 
deflation is taking place. The Central bank starts buying securities in the open market. Papers 
pile up with the bank, money being pumped into the system and credit creating ability of 
commercial banks rises. The policy may not succeed if people keep sale proceeds with them 
or demand for funds stays unresponsive. For, one can take a horse to water but cannot make 
him drink against his will. 
      Open market operations have some serious limitations as a measure of credit control. 
During inflation, the prices of fixed return securities – Islamic or non-Islamic – tend to fall 
because of better income avenues now available for free funds. Thus, in all probability the 
Central Bank must sell securities at prices lower than at what it may have purchased them. In 
the same way, it must purchase securities at higher prices during recession compared to new 
investments. Thus, it is likely to incur losses on purchases too. How much loss of money the 
bank can take and justify it in a democratic set up is an important question
6
. As open market 
operations too work via affecting return on securities divergent from the coupon rates, the 
method departs from Islamic norm of avoiding interest.  
Statutory reserve requirements  
We have mentioned earlier that the scheduled commercial banks – conventional or Islamic – 
have to maintain a certain percentage of their cash deposits in their accounts with the central 
bank. This ratio can be increased or decreased by the central bank. The central banks use the 
ratio variation discretion as a measure of credit control. As this policy measure contracts or 
expands the cash base of the commercial banks it is an effective measure in the hands of 
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10bn a month  (BBC News 2014)  
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central banks. They lower the ratio to overcome recessionary trends in the economy and raise 
the same when inflation is rearing its head.  
Cash deposit ratio. 
As a supplement to the statutory reserve requirement the central banks have a second string to 
their bow – the cash-deposit ratio. While reserve maintenance with the central bank makes 
commercial banks part with cash, they are not obliged to so in case of cash-deposit ratio. 
Here the banks do not lose their hold on cash but only have to maintain a minimal of cash 
with them defined by the ratio the central bank indicates from time to time. The impact of 
variation in the ratio is the same as variation in the reserve maintenance ratio. Islamic 
economists have no reservations about the use of the two ratios as methods of controlling 
credit creation by banks (Ahmad, 2008). 
 Moral suasion 
Finally, as the Central Bank has special privileges and power, especially as the lender of the 
last resort it acts as a philosopher, friend and guide to all commercial banks in the system. 
Banks listen to its advice. Sometimes a circular issued to the banks concerning credit 
management may have the desired impact. Thus, ‘moral suasion’ is counted among the 
methods of credit control.     
       There have been claims that Islamic banks withstood the current crisis better than their 
conventional counterparts. Several studies including Hasan and Dridi (2010), Lewis (2008), and 
Mirakhor (2007), indeed found that Islamic banks are generally more resilient to the crisis than the 
conventional.  Cihak and Hesse (2010) find that small Islamic banks are stronger financially than 
small conventional banks. Beck et.al (2013) conclude that Islamic banks perform better in  terms of 
capitalization, asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crisis.  But there are also 
those who do not subscribe to this view. Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) for example, show that there is no 
significant difference in terms of the effect of the financial crisis on the soundness of Islamic banks 
and conventional banks.. One comes across some interesting observations on the issue in the IFSB 
2013 Stability Report. The opening observation says that Islamic banks are found in a comparative 
study more resilient than the conventional; the reason being their sturdy capitalization ratios. But the 
Report hastens to add that these ratios for Islamic banks declined in Asian jurisdictions in 2007-2011, 
while conventional banks augmented their capitalization during that period (Executive Summary). 
Thus, the debate on the point remains inconclusive.  
        For us, Islamic banking is too small and has not yet developed the connectivity with the 
global system to attract infection. In any case, not a few Islamic banks did come to grief, 
especially in the Middle-East. Kuwait has recently refused to bailout the defaulting banks in 
the country. In sum, time has not yet come to feel elated; many hurdles have to be crossed; 
challenges have to be met to bring ground realities closer to aspirations. 
 
7. Some related issues 
We now turn briefly to the three issues gaining currency in discussions on Islamic banking in 
the wake of the ongoing financial turmoil across the globe. These include (a) Islamic banks 
have not been much affected by the current turmoil which shows the comparative resilience 
of their modus operandi (b) risk-sharing is or should be the sole basis of financing in Islam 
and (c) the efficacy of governmental intervention to pre-empt such crises in future.  
 
(a) Current financial crisis and Islamic banks 
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Introductory section of this paper provided a thumbnail sketch of the financial crisis that has 
downed mighty banks even governments in the West over the past more than five years and 
gives little hope of abating. During this period has emerged a new line of thought combining 
two propositions. Islamic banks have faced the crisis better than the conventional testifying to 
the inherent strength and resilience of the system. This strength follows from a close link 
between financial flows and productivity in the real sector of the economy. Nabi (2012) finds 
that the presence of diversification in Islamic banking sector across countries reduces the 
vulnerability of financial contagion. Ahmed (2010) confirms:  “This intrinsic property of 
Islamic finance contributes towards insulating it from the potential risks resulting from excess 
leverage and speculative financial activities which are part of the root causes of the current 
financial crisis”. Abbas (2007) contains similar views. True, the factors mentioned in these 
writings might have kept Islamic banks less affected during the crisis but at the same time we 
cannot ignore certain other factors which softened the impact crisis on Islamic banks. 
Consider for example the following points.  
 
1) Islamic banks are still too small to attract the contagion because of their tiny existence; 
the ratio of Islamic banks asset to the conventional is just 1:164 in 2011 even as it has 
been improving over the years
7
 It has climbed down to 1:112 in June 2014.  
2) It does not probably take one far to say that Islamic banks are not affected because they 
are based on profit and loss sharing. To be frank, the contribution of Islamic banks to 
participatory finance has still not crossed the 20% mark, the remaining transactions are 
essentially debt-based. (Hasan 2014) 
3) Islamic banks have not yet developed enough connectivity with the mainstream system 
for the transmission of the contagion. Even then, it is not true that Islamic banks have not 
at all been affected. It is on record that several banks including Nakheel of UAE landed 
in trouble and the state have to bail out and Kuwait refused to bail out their failing banks. 
4) Most comparisons employ econometric models where sample designs, reliability of data 
as also their homogeneity over time and space may be carry question marks. Particullarly  
 
                                                          
7
 The ratio is based on the volume of global financial assets being $213 trillion (IMF Financial Report 2013 and 
Islamic financial assets $1.3 trillion according to a Reuters 2012 study.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Islamic Banking global growth trends 
Source: IFSB Survey Report 2013 (Modified) 
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infection within the system units is a smaller matter than the overall macro impact of the 
turmoil on various banking variables. Here the injury is not the result of financial markets 
chaos; it is just its reflection. It is the consequence of wide and wild lurching of the broad 
macroeconomic variables – national income, savings, investment, money supply taxation, 
wage levels and so on. Figure 4 is revealing on the point. 
 
(b) Risk-sharing as the sole principle for Islamic finance 
From the perception that Islamic banks have faced the financial crisis better than their 
conventional rivals some Islamic scholars – particularly my friend Abbas in his various 
writings – probably thought that the basic reason is the avoidance of interest in Islam. This 
view has some serious implications: (i) interest based financing is entirely risk-free (ii) Islam 
does not allow fixed return on investment in any circumstance, (iii) No risk transfer is 
involved in a sharing scheme and (iv) finally, risk-sharing is automatically equitable. Let us 
examine if these implications are tenable.  
      In fact, pleading for risk-sharing as the sole permissible Islamic principle for financing is 
not new: it is a re-echo of the age long precept of the earlier Islamic economists epitomized in 
the Chapa’s ‘No risk, no gain’ rule highlighted in his 1986 publication Towards a just 
monetary system. The evaluation of the precept was central to Hasan (2005). I need not 
reiterate my position here.     
    Now, the success of any policy to pre-empt future turmoil and maintain economic stability 
presumes a minimal honesty in intention and operation on the part of those who implement 
the reforms. And it is here that many are not sure of the required integrity. They cite the 
evidence from the happenings that led to the current debacle: interest-rate-property-price 
manipulation to reap speculative windfalls by the bank owners and managers (Bianco et al 
2008) Figure 5 throws some light on the connection.  
 
 
the lagged response seems to reveal. In section X falling interest rates eventually pushed up 
property prices leading to expansion of mortgage loans. Interest rates gradually climbed up in 
Y section. Property prices continue rising for a while before correction could take place. Soon 
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Figure 5: Low interest rates pushed up property prices but before the buyers could take in 
profit hikes in interest rates caused the crash in the property market. Fore closures mounted.  
Mortgage market debacle snowballed to other sectors of the economy and across countries.   
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property price crashed, foreclosures became rampant, collapsing banks in the process. In 
section Z interest rates touch the bottom, property prices recover slightly but then dip 
irrevocably: the crisis was well on course. Nicholas Ryder (2014) provides a detailed and 
graphic chronicle of crimes leading to the near collapse of the western financial system. In 
the process he raises some exceedingly important questions doubting the system’s ability 
even to recognize such crimes, let alone its ability to address them. 
         Such sort of doubts revitalized old arguments in favour of governmental non-
intervention in the markets. Recently, it was Robert Higgs (2012) who set the ball rolling: he 
saw the genesis of financial crises in the governmental intervention in national economies 
through the abridging of property rights and their mishandling. Higgs wrote: 
 
In my conception regime uncertainty pertains above all to a pervasive uncertainty about the 
property-rights regime—about what private owners can reliably expect the government to do in its 
actions that affect private owners’ ability to control the use of their property, to reap the income it 
yields, and to transfer it to others on mutually acceptable terms.  
 
Palpably, it is the reiteration of the old laissez faire doctrine that walked smart in the guise of 
liberalization towards the closing decades of the last century.  
         However, dissentions to non-intervention today are much louder. The global financial 
crisis has given greater credence to the idea that active state involvement in the financial 
sector can help maintain economic stability, drive growth, and create jobs. There is evidence 
that some interventions may have had an impact, at least in the short run. Even as there is 
some evidence that governmental intervention might have negative effects in the long run, it 
does not mean that the state should desist from keeping an eye on financial happenings to be 
caught napping (Cihak 2008; and Demirguc Kunt, 2013). 
         Islam stands for freedom of the individual and the markets but not at the cost of social 
well-being and fair play. The religion is not anti-rich and grants all protection to private 
earnings and wealth. But its norms of legitimacy are not a matter for market arbitration. State 
regulation of market behavior and practices carries undisputed evidence over time and space 
in history. Islamic requirements for the fulfillment of basic needs, removal of poverty, 
reduction in inequities and keeping the balances straight in all spheres of life presupposes a 
substantial state intervention in the economic life of the community with discretion. 
Government intervention in economic activities under Islamic dispensation is to be a source 
of certainty, not of uncertainty.  
       Let one understand that capitalism is in essence a system that free markets operate to 
protect and promote the interests of the capitalist class the world over through persuasion or 
oppression. Apart from unabated availability of human labor, natural resources and 
instruments for production, it pre-supposes the existence of a financial system to lubricate the 
wheels of trade industry and commerce. Islamic banks chose to join the competitive race of 
the system. In this competition, they cannot avoid credit creation which is the life blood of 
modern interest-based financing.  Operating in a dual financial system, Islamic banks cannot 
survive without following conventional banks in some ways not to their liking albeit they can 
possibly avoid using the institution of interest and what goes with it. 
          In continuation, it is fallacious to argue that Islam approves only risk-sharing as basis 
of economic organization. And, to restrict it to finance alone implies that the dispute is 
conceived as within the capitalists’ house to the exclusion of other cooperators in production, 
14 
 
especially labour. To that extent, the talk of justice in sharing may perpetrate injustice. Islam 
does allow fixed returns to factors of production; it grants even time value for money in 
deferred payment contracts. Let us be clear that an economy cannot work without a fixed 
incomes’ benchmark. It is like seeing geography work without the sea level being the 
reference for measuring heights. Are not Islamic banks currently using interest rates for 
bench marking? (Shaukat 2014) 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 We have examined the instruments central banks can use to regulate credit creation from 
Islamic perspective and have suggested a new measure based on the Islamic profit sharing 
norm. Its merit is that it can impact both categories of banks – Islamic and conventional – in 
the same direction without imposing costs on the central banks.  
       The year 2009 was a critical for Islamic Finance as the downturn tested the resilience of 
the institutions and financing structures that endeavor to comply with the ethical and moral 
investment guidelines that form the core of the Shariah law. The crisis, however, showed that 
the sector has not been without its casualties, with high-profile Islamic names such as 
Tamweel, Amlak and The Investment Dar falling foul of the credit crunch (Howladar, 2010). 
Thus, the industry is likely to face increasing challenge in the future. Diversification, product 
innovation and standardization of norms and harmonization of regulations across countries 
can go a long way to help Islamic finance industry face the impeding challenge.  
         Islam stands for freedom of the individual and the markets but not at the cost of social 
well-being and fair play. The religion is not anti-rich and grants all protection to private 
earnings and wealth. But its norms of legitimacy are not a matter for market arbitration. State 
regulation of market behavior and practices carries undisputed evidence over time and space 
in history. Islamic requirements for the fulfillment of basic needs, removal of poverty, 
reduction in inequities and keeping the balances straight in all spheres of life presupposes a 
substantial state intervention in the economic life of the community with discretion. 
Government intervention in economic activities is to be a source of certainty, not of 
uncertainty under Islamic dispensation.  
         However, to pronounce ethical norms is one thing; to see them operate on groud is quite 
another. It will far from truth to opine that conventional financial settings are devoid of 
ethical norms of behavior; the lament is that it is the blatant continual violation of these 
norms that has dragged the world to the brink of disaster.  
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